Abstract-With the development of network service technology such as grid computing, cloud computing, the cooperation among multiply domains is needed for these intelligent services that have the unlimited space and the unlimited speed. This paper proposes a new union authentication protocol of cross-domain that can ensure the security of resource access in different domains, where the register keys of members in one domain are submitted to the key authentication center, rather than the private keys. This authentication protocol can avoid the shortcoming that it is complex to deliver certification in the traditional crossdomain authentication based on PKI and prevent the authority counter from pretending to be a member to access resources in other domains in the current identity-based authentication. The performance analysis shows that the proposed authentication protocol has good anonymity and can track the entities when there are the inconsistent cases. At last, a prototype system that can implement the authentication protocol is given.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-domain union (MDU) is used in large networks, its services and access-points are distributed in multiple domain. In the distributed network environment, the companies and the agencies have their own shared resource. In order to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the shared resource, every company or agency sets up the local authentication service. So every entry has a relatively independent trust domain, in which the users trust the local authentication center and the local authentication service is conveniently provided for the local user. However, the single domain can not satisfy the great deal of service requests. For example, the requirement for accessing resources is great in cloud computing environment, and the multi-domain resource request is needed. It is noted that the shared resource requests not only come from the internal domain, but also from the outer domain. Therefore, the problem of crossdomain identity authentication will occur when the users in the foreign trust domain access the resources in the local trust domain.
There are many applications which are based on the cross-domain authentication, such as entity authentication among the multiple heterogeneous domains in the virtual organization of the grid environment, mobile access authentication in wireless network environment. The existing cross-domain authentication frameworks in special environments mainly include the Symmetric key Infrastructure (such as Kerberos [1] ) and the traditional Public Key Infrastructure [2] [3] [4] (PKI for shot). The former has disadvantage that the symmetric key management and key negotiation is very complex, which can not effectively deal with the anonymous problem. The later has shortcoming that the costs of certification management is expensive, such as certification status checking, certification path construction and certification delivery. The authentication center's network easily becomes a bottleneck if the frequency of cross-domain resource access is high. The multi-domain authentication models based on identity were proposed in the references [5] [6] . It is precondition that the foreign authentication centers are trusted and the key negotiation parameters of each domain must keep same in this proposed mode, which lead to the limitation that the foreign authentication center is not prevented from pretending to be a member of local domain. References [7] [8] [9] used the identity-based signature method to realize the internal resource access authentication in the same domain, but this method can not work in the cross-domain. Lu [10] improved the Malone-Lee's method and implemented it between domains. However, its precondition is suppose that each Public key Generator (PKG for short) is honest, because PKG has the private key of others domains and the user's identity authenticity and the private key security could not be guaranteed if the PKG is malware. This paper proposes a union authentication protocol of cross-domain which is based on the signature verification between two domains. In the signature method, the parameters generated in the different authentication centers for multiply domains may be not same and the register keys, rather than the private keys of members within one domain are submitted. So there are no private keys in the authentication center, which can prevent the authentication center from pretending to be a local member to access resources of other domains. This proposed authentication protocol has better anonymity and can avoid all kinds of attacks and it support that members can be traced when there are the inconsistencies in accessing the resources.
II. THE BASIS OF FINITE GROUP THEORY

A. Automorphism Groups in the Finite Group
Suppose that G represents a group and AutG denotes an automorphism group of G, C(G) is defined as the center of G and the cyclic group labeled as <g> is generated by the element g. If G is a finite group whose order is labeled as |G| that represents the number of elements included in G and there is the equation that is |G| = p n (n>0) to be true (p is a prime number), G is called p-group and the subgroups whose order is equal to the several power of p are called p-subgroups. If H is a psubgroup of the finite group G and |G| = p k *m, |H| = p k and (p k , m) = 1, H is called the sylow p-subgroup of G. Lemma 1 [11] : Suppose that G is a finite Abel group and p 1 ,p 2 ,……p n are all the prime of |G| and G pi (1≤i≤n) is the sylow p-subgroup of G, the equation that G = G p1 ＊G p2 ＊…＊G pn follows.
Lemma 2 [11] : Suppose that if G = G 1 ＊G 2 ＊…＊G n , K i is a subgroup of G i , and K 1 , K 2 ,…, K n are isomorphic, G has the number n of isomorphic subgroups.
Lemma 3 [11] : Suppose that G 1 = <g 1 > represents a cyclic group whose order is m and G 2 = <g 2 > represents a cyclic group whose order is n. If (m, n) = 1, G 1 ＊G 2 denotes a cyclic group whose order equal m *n.
B. Bilinear Group
The definition of bilinear mapping [12] is given firstly. Suppose that G 1 labeled as G 1 = <g 1 > is a cyclic multiplicative group whose order is p, G 2 labeled as G 2 = <g 2 > is a cyclic multiplicative group whose order is q and G 3 is a group, the bilinear mapping is defined as 1 2 3 : e G G G × → that has the following properties. In the authentication system of multiply trust domains, the internal authentication type of each domain could be separately chosen according to its own demand while the mode of authentication among domains should have a uniform definition in order to make the interoperability of across-domains convenient. This paper designs the union authentication system model of cross-domain (see Fig. 1 ) . The internal authentication of one domain will be not discussed in this paper.
In Fig. 1 , the union authentication system is composed of multiple domains. Each domain is independent, autonomous and it consists of a key authentication center (KCA for short) and many internal domain members. The function of KCA is as same as that of the traditional authentication center (CA or PKG for short). The internal members are the owners and visitors of the resources. They need to access the across-domain resources when they work together. The basic idea of cross-domain union authentication protocol is that each authentication center selects one group from multiple heterogeneous cyclic groups, generates its own key parameters based on this cyclic group, distributes and manages the key of local domain, and opens its public key at the same time in order to realize resource access and authentication between two domains. When a new member joins one domain, he needs to register his identity for entity tracking.
IV. THE ANONYMOUS SIGNNATURE SCHEME AMONG MULTIPLY DOMAINS
A. Innitialization of System
The number Q of big prime numbers are selected and constitute the set labeled as
from which a big prime number P is chosen, and a supersingular elliptic curve E/GF(p) is found which meets the security assumptions of WDH. Subsequently, G is generated which is the subgroup of E/GF(p). The order of G is q and
Based on the Lemma 2 above, we construct the number Q of subgroups of G which are isomorphic to each other and the set of these subgroup is labeled as
In multi-domain union, every domain selects a different subgroup labeled as G k (1≤k≤Q) from G set that is used as the key generation parameters of the local domain.
B. Anonymous Signature Scheme between Two Domains
(1) Parameters selection Suppose that the cyclic groups G 1 = <g 1 > and G 2 = <g 2 > are respectively selected as the key generation parameters for two domains D 1 and D 2 in the union domain. G 1 and G 2 are the prime isomorphism groups in the set G set . g 1 and g 2 are the generation elements of G 1 and G 2 respectively. as his private key and the corresponding public key is
Then U i calculates the value ( )
which is used as the key to register in KCA 1 . Thus KCA 1 will establish the correspondences relationship between reg i and the identity of U i so that the identity of members can be traced. For every other domain, the case is similar.
In addition, suppose that the member U 1 within the domain D 1 has the public/private key pair labeled as When U 1 accesses the resources of U 2 , the signature procedure is described as follows: . . 
V.THE UNION AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL OF ACROSS-DOMAIN
A member in one domain needs to be authenticated when he accesses the resources of other domains for safety's sake. However, there is only one authentication center in every domain, which is easy to become a bottleneck when lots of authentication activities need to be handled. In order to improve the speed of resource access and make full use of resources, this paper designs an authentication protocol of across-domain union, in which the authentication operation isn't executed by the authentication center when the members access the resources of cross-domain. That is to say, a member in one domain can be directly authenticated by a member in other domain.
Suppose :( , , , , , , , , ) The detailed authentication procedure of cross-domain is described as the following steps:
(1) U 1 sends the resource access type, the public key of the local authentication center, the public key of another domain which will be accessed and other parameters s h o w n a s f o r m u l a ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) t o U 2 ;
(2) U 2 verifies that U 1 is a member of D 1 indeed by calculating formula (3), but only the public key of U 1 is known and other identity information don't be known at this moment; (3) U 2 selects an arbitrary message m and uses the parameters shown as formula (2) to calculate the identification value c based on the formula (4), and sends it to U 1; (4) U 1 generates the signature parameters by using the r e c e i v e d v a l u e c , a n d s e n d s t h e m t o U 2 ; (5) U 2 uses those signature parameters to identify that U 1 is a given member of D 1 , which prevents the authentication center from pretending and conceals the detailed identity information of U 1 .
In addition, we give the overview of the procedure of negotiating the session key.
Step 1: U 2 selects an arbitrary integer Step 2: U 1 uses its own private key 1
x to decrypt Step 3: U 1 selects an arbitrary integer
and sends it to U 2;
Step 4: U 2 uses his own private key 2
x to decrypt Step 5: U 1 and U 2 calculate the temporary session key.
VI.PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
A. Correctness Analysis
The authentication protocol is based on the signature, so we must guarantee the signature is correct if we want to verify the authenticated user is a member of a given domain in the domain union. The correctness of signature is deduced as follows: 
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B. Unforgeability Analysis
None member and nor authentication center within the domain can pretend to be another member to access resources of cross-domain. The reason is that the private key of every member of a domain is not the public information. Suppose that the authentication center KCA 1 in the domain D 1 want to visit the resources of a member U 2 within another domain D 2 , he pretends to be a member U 1 and then sends the public key of inter-domain 
C. Anonymity Analysis
The authentication protocol can guarantee that the authentication center don't know the detailed identity information of a foreign member U 1 while he can confirm that U 1 comes from a given domain. The reason is that the authentication union protocol of cross-domain includes two authentication steps, which can satisfy the anonymous requirement. The first step is a member U 1 sends his public key of cross-domain to a member U 2 and U 2 verifies that U 1 comes from the domain D 1 . The second step is U 1 send his signature to U 2 , U 2 verifies the signature of U 1 is correct and knows he is the given member whose information could be used for tracing when there are inconsistent problems.
D. Traceability Analysis
The proposed authentication protocol has the traceability. The tracing information is the register key reg 1 that is included in the public key of cross-domain 
E. Security Analysis
The signature scheme used in the authentication protocol of cross-domain is based on the theory of bilinear group and its security depends on the complex nature of the problems that include calculating discrete logarithms of the large prime and of the elliptic curve. In our cryptosystem, cyclic groups are generated by using the large prime in the elliptic curve as the generation element. Therefore, the security of the register key sent to KCA by members in local domain is guaranteed by the complex nature of the problem that is calculating the discrete logarithm of the large prime and the security of the session key negotiation procedure is guaranteed by the complex nature of the problem that is calculating the discrete logarithm of the elliptic curve. Based on the security above, the middleman attacks, spoofing attacks and replay attacks can be avoided.
(1) Preventing middleman attack: Assume that the middleman tries to attack this protocol, it is impossible to reach an agreement during negotiating the session key, because the public key is verified by the signature. When the step 
) dpk T T T T R R R R R c . (3) Preventing replay attack:
The temporary session key is used one time when two members in different domains communicate with each other, which could prevent replay attack.
The analysis above shows that the authentication protocol is correct and that it could prevent effectively spoofing attack. It could achieve authentication when two members that communicate with each other don't know the identification of the other, so it has good anonymity. When the issue occurs, the entity could be traced and attacks could be prevented effectively, so the protocol has good security.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
A. Communication Protocol and Programming Environment
For proposed authentication protocol, we design and implement a prototype system. This prototype system uses point to point encryption based on the TCP/IP communication protocol, which improves the portability of system and is easier to be implemented. In addition, point to point encryption can provide protection for the continuous data transmission between two end users located in different domains. For the middle users at the transmission chain, the messages are encrypted.
The object-oriented program-developing tool named Visual C++ 6.0 is selected as our programming language to implement the prototype system and the Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ Library (MIRACL for short) is also used to generate the user signature and execute the authentication. Finally, the prototype system runs on Windows XP operating system. Fig.2 shows the algorithm structure of our prototype system. All algorithms are encapsulated in the classes. For example, the big integer arithmetic at the low level composes the main functions of the Big Class and the Enc Class includes all the elliptic curve operations at the middle level, which are already be implemented in the MIRACL. Therefore, the prototype system is easier to be implemented based on the MIRACL. 
B. The Structure of Prototype System
C. Implementation of Communication between Two Entries
In our prototype system, there are three types of communication entries, including the KCA, the resource Fig.2 Algorithm level of prototype system visitor and the resource provider. For the resource provider, it is possible to be both a server and a client during the communication based on the TCP/IP protocol while the KCA must be a server and the resource visitor is a client. The server and the client establish the connection between them by using the Windows Socket, where four functions such as Socket(), Bind(), Listen() and Accept() are used to the server process and two functions such as Socket() and Connect() are used to the client process. Fig. 3 shows the communication process between a server and a client.
D. Implementation of Authentication Protocol
The proposed authentication protocol is implemented by using the sharing files and some main functions in the MIRCAL. These sharing files include four C++ source files such as big.cpp, ecn.cpp, zzn.cpp, zzn2.cpp and six header files such as big.h, ecn.h, miracle.h, mirdef.h, zzn.h, zzn2.h. The functions are This is a hash function that mainly achieves the number system conversion.
With the following steps, the detailed authentication protocol is implemented.
Step 1: The initial parameters of each trust domain are generated. The main function file is para_set.cpp. When the authentication system is initialized, a nine-bit binary number needs to be input which represents the ID of this domain. Then the bilinear pairing and other initial parameters are generated and stored into the file common.para, except that the master key is stored in the file master.para.
Step 2: The register keys of members in one domain are generated. Each member selects randomly a big prime as its private key and stores it into the file private.para,. Then the register key is computed based on the master key and other system parameters that are generated in the previous step. At last, each member submits its register key to the KCA of the local domain. The file that achieves this function is register.cpp.
Step 3: The resource visitor computes its signature based on the identification value c that is sent by the resource provider. The implementation of this step refers to the formulas (1)-(5) described in section V.
Step 4: The resource provider verifies the signature of the visitor. Based on the public parameters 1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  5 ( , , , , , , , , , , ) dpk T T T T R R R R R c , the signature of the visitor can be verified by performing the following steps: 
VIII. CONCLUSION
The authentication of multi-domain union can ensure the security of sharing resources in multi-domain network environment. The proposed authentication protocol of cross-domain union in this paper can satisfy the secure requirement of accessing the resources in other domains while the resources in different domains can be shared. In addition, it has the anonymity that can protect the private information of members within one domain and the better flexibility because every member can visit the resources in other domains without the involvement of KCA in the local domain. What's more, this protocol has better security and practicality because it can avoid the bottlenecks and the complex certification delivery of traditional PKI model.
